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ABSTRACT 
 
Malaysia’s Corporate Directors Training 
Programme (CDTP) aims to increase the 
awareness of company directors towards good 
corporate governance.  In this paper, 
observations will be shared and suggestions for 
improvement (partly based on insights from 
knowledge management) made on both the 
overall structure of CDTP and specifically its 
corporate governance component, so that the 
participating directors may more readily immerse 
in the subjects.  The paper’s discussion also shed 
lights on the lack of proper corporate information 
and knowledge management in Malaysia.  It is 
proposed that the corporate-governance module 
be redesigned into three smaller units 
emphasizing both principles and practices.  
Moreover, the CDTP course materials should be 
shortened and include exercises and evaluation.  
It is envisioned that the revamped CDTP will 
more effectively achieve the goal of fostering a 
more healthy business environment in Malaysia.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, the Companies Commission of Malaysia 
(CCM) introduced a training course held through-
out Malaysia called Corporate Directors Training 
Programme (CDTP).  CDTP was supposed to be 
attended by company directors as well as those 
who would soon become directors.  Since then, 
more than 70,000 out of more than 850,000 
company directors from both inside and outside of 
Malaysia have attended the course.  The Malays-
ian Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer 
Affairs has also announced recently that legis-
lation is being prepared to make the course 
mandatory for all company directors in Malaysia. 
Among the topics covered in CDTP is corporate 
governance, which has come under spotlight 
lately owing to the much publicised corporate 
scandals both within and outside Malaysia.  In 
fact, as De Geus (1995) pointed out, a company 
needs a higher level of skill in dealing with a 
changing environment, as it may be argued that 
the current Malaysian business environment is 
just such a changing environment, where 
knowledge of good corporate governance practice 
is increasingly crucial for corporate survival.  In 
addition, it has also been recognized that the 
ability of organisation to compete will depend 
increasingly upon their ability to compete, 
develop new knowledge, and create maximum 
market value for the knowledge (Finerty, 1997; 
Stonehouse and Pemberton, 2000). 
In the sections below, the authors, including a 
frequent CDTP lecturer and a course participant, 
will share their observations on CDTP in general 
and corporate governance in CDTP specifically, 
and suggest some ways and means for improving 
both the overall course structure as well as the 
specific coverage of corporate governance in 
CDTP, such that the course may be even more 
relevant to and readily accepted by the 
participating directors. 
2.0 OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE 
DIRECTORS TRAINING PRO-
GRAMME 
Presently, CDTP is conducted over one and a half 
day.  It is made up of six modules, each to be 
delivered over one and a half hour.  The modules 
are (i) the duties and responsibilities of company 
directors (Companies Commission of Malaysia, 
2001a); (ii) law and practices of company meet-
ings (Companies Commission of Malaysia, 
2001b); (iii) common offences committed by 
company directors (Companies Commission of 
Malaysia, 2001c); (iv) economic crimes in Malay-
sia (Companies Commission of Malaysia, 2001d); 
(v) corruption: offences and their prevention 
(Companies Commission of Malaysia, 2001e); 
and (vi) the importance of good corporate 
governance (Companies Commission of Malay-
sia, 2001f).  The issue of corporate governance is 
primarily covered by the last module (Companies 
Commission of Malaysia, 2001f) but also part of 
the first module (Companies Commission of 
Malaysia, 2001a).  This section will briefly intro-
duce the subject matters covered in the first five 
modules of CDTP (Companies Commission of 
Malaysia, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e). 
2.1 Duties and Responsibilities of Company 
Directors 
The first CDTP module (Companies Commission 
of Malaysia, 2001a) mainly reminds directors of 
their fiduciary duties to act in the best interest of 
the company in which they serve as directors.  
Directors’ fiduciary duties include the following: 
(i) to act in good faith; (ii) to exercise power 
properly for proper purpose; (iii) to avoid conflict 
of interest; (iv) to retain discretion of future 
directors; (v) to act with care, skill and diligence; 
and (vi) to prevent the company from insolvent 
trading. 
2.2 Law and Practices of Company Meetings 
 
The second CDTP module (Companies 
Commission of Malaysia, 2001b) covers various 
types of meetings, including those legally requi-
red, which are typically held in Malaysian 
companies.  They include board of directors meet-
ings, general (shareholders) meetings, committee 
meetings, statutory meetings and “class” meet-
ings.  The module sets out the various rules and 
regulations governing company meetings, inclu-
ding the various requirements of general meet-
ings, such as convening, notice, quorum, etc. 
 
2.3 Common Offences under the Companies 
Act 1965 Committed by Company 
Directors 
 
The third CDTP module (Companies Commission 
of Malaysia, 2001c) is usually delivered by a 
CCM officer who enumerates those offences.  
Some of the more common offences are such as 
non-holding of annual general meeting or non-
tabling of accounts at the general meeting, non-
submission of company’s annual return, failure to 
keep company’s accounting records, directors’ 
conflicts of interest with the company, false or 
misleading statements, etc. 
 
2.4 Economic Crimes in Malaysia 
 
The fourth module (Companies Commission of 
Malaysia, 2001d) is usually delivered by a police 
officer who first defines economic crimes and 
shows the trends of these crimes in Malaysia.  
These crimes, often encountered in a business 
setting, are such as bank frauds, counterfeit 
currencies, frauds involving securities, credit card 
frauds, etc.  The elements of the crimes, together 
with their punishments, are typically spelled out, 
ending with some useful hints as to how to 
prevent or mitigate these crimes. 
 
2.5 Corruption: Offences and Their 
Prevention 
 
This module (Companies Commission of 
Malaysia, 2001e) is usually conveyed by an Anti 
Corruption Agency (ACA) officer.  The main 
objective is to create an awareness amongst the 
directors of the dangers of corruption to society.  
The corruption-related offences and penalties are 
spelled out, together with legal obligations to 
report acts of corruption, as well as the protection 
afforded to informers. 
 
3.0 THE STATUS OF CORPORATE GO-
VERNANCE IN CORPORATE DIR-
ECTORS TRAINING PROGRAMME 
In CDTP, as mentioned above, the subject matter 
of corporate governance is covered by both the 
first – “duties and responsibilities of company 
directors” (Companies Commission of Malaysia, 
2001a) – and the last – “the importance of good 
corporate governance” (Companies Commission 
of Malaysia, 2001f) modules.  The latter module 
(Companies Commission of Malaysia, 2001f) 
gave a more bird’s eye view of corporate govern-
ance, while the former module (Companies Com-
mission of Malaysia, 2001a) takes a more hands-
on approach to corporate governance. 
3.1 The Importance of Good Corporate 
Governance 
In “the importance of good corporate governance” 
module (Companies Commission of Malaysia, 
2001f), corporate governance is split into two 
elements: (1) objective and (2) structure and 
process.  The objective of corporate governance is 
said to be the enhancement of business prosperity 
with proper accountability of directors to stake-
holders such as shareholders, creditors, govern-
ment and society.  The structure and process of a 
company, on the other hand, concern the set of 
rules (such as the Companies Act of 1965 and the 
articles and memorandum of association of the 
company) which govern the conducts of a comp-
any as the management and direction of a comp-
any. 
A history of companies in general and corporate 
governance specifically is also elaborated in this 
module.  Starting with the emergence of 
partnership in the 13th century, and through the 
formation of association with company charac-
teristics in 17th century, business entities matured 
into companies in the 19th century with a series of 
law enacted by both the British Parliament as well 
as the courts.  In Malaysia, in particular, company 
laws started with the Indian Companies Act of 
1866, which evolved into the present Companies 
Act of 1965 (with subsequent amendments).  
Corporate governance is thus said to be not a new 
subject but an evolving system by which comp-
anies are properly controlled and managed. 
3.2 Recent Interest in Good Corporate 
Governance 
Besides, various factors have triggered the recent 
interest in corporate governance.  They are such 
as investors’ greater expectations on company 
performance, globalisation, concerns over comp-
any competitiveness, series of domestic and for-
eign corporate scandals and failures, and also an 
increasing degree of participation by institutional 
investors such as pension funds.  A direct relat-
ionship is said to exist between good corporate 
governance and investor confidence.  This public 
interest in corporate governance has prompted 
actions to be undertaken by governments, inclu-
ding a move to disclosure-based regulation, the 
strengthening of accounting standards, insider 
trading laws, substantial shareholding laws and 
conflict-of-interest law as well as limitation on the 
number directorships.  (Companies Commission 
of Malaysia, 2001f) 
3.3 Weaknesses in Malaysian Corporate 
Governance 
This module (Companies Commission of 
Malaysia, 2001f) also identifies weaknesses in the 
corporate governance structure of mostly public 
listed companies, such as untimely release of 
financial information and misleading announce-
ments (both subjects pointing to the lack of proper 
corporate knowledge management), non-holding 
of general meetings, and non-disclosure of sub-
stantial shareholding.  In this respect, it should be 
pointed out that organisational learning (which is 
crucial for survival of a company in a knowledge 
economy) is about detecting errors or anomalies 
(and hence weaknesses) and correcting them by 
restructuring organisational theories in use 
(Argyris and Schoen, 1978).   
On the government’s side, problems such as 
ineffective enforcement by regulators, overlap-
ping regulations, and uncoordinated enforcement 
activities exist.  To overcome these weaknesses 
and problems, various changes to the laws are 
being introduced.  For instance, Section 99B of 
the Security Industry Act now requires directors 
and CEOs to disclose interests in listed company 
to the Securities Commission.  The Companies 
Act 1965 has also been amended to require dis-
closure of substantial shareholding (5%). 
3.4 Shareholder Passiveness in Malaysia 
The passivity of shareholders has also been 
highlighted as another weakness in Malaysia’s 
corporate governance system.  The directors are 
made aware of their rights as shareholders (if they 
happen to also be), such as obtaining injunction, 
getting an order against repressive actions, going 
to minister for an appointment of an inspector to 
investigate the company, and even winding up a 
company.  They are reminded that they should 
count themselves fortunate that Malaysian 
minority shareholders are usually not litigious, 
else otherwise many of them would have been 
brought to court for breach of fiduciary duties due 
to negligence, ignorance, lack of skill and 
incompetence. 
3.5 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
 
Participating directors are also introduced to the 
report of the 1998 High-Level Finance Committee 
on Corporate Governance, which aimed to 
strengthen the influence of shareholders, empo-
wer the boards of directors, strengthen regulatory 
enforcement, as well as promote high standards 
through training and education (Malaysian Inst-
itute of Corporate Governance, 2000).  The key 
recommendations of the Committee include 
enhancing of disclosures in annual reports, stricter 
criteria for independent directors, and codification 
of directors’ fiduciary duties, etc, with the 
ultimate objectives of transparency, board 
accountability to shareholders and protection of 
minority shareholders (Malaysian Institute of 
Corporate Governance, 2000).  Two resulting 
efforts were the creation of the Minority Share-
holder Watchdog Group and the adoption of the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(2000). 
 
Indeed, the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (2000) is only briefly introduced in 
this module (Companies Commission of Malay-
sia, 2001f).  According to the module (Companies 
Commission of Malaysia, 2001f), Part I of the 
Code (Malaysian Institute of Corporate Govern-
ance, 2000) sets out broad principles of good 
corporate governance which relate to directors 
and their remuneration (and disclosure of the 
latter), shareholders, annual general meetings, 
balanced and understandable assessment of the 
company’s position and prospects, and internal 
controls.  Part II of the Code (Malaysian Institute 
of Corporate Governance, 2000), on the other 
hand, sets out best practices for companies.  
However, the module (Companies Commission of 
Malaysia, 2001f) does not spell out the specifics 
of the Code (Malaysian Institute of Corporate 
Governance, 2000). 
 
3.6 Selection of Company Directors 
 
The “importance of good corporate governance” 
module concludes by emphasising that the one of 
the most important element in good corporate 
governance is the selection of the “right” directors 
for the company, such as those who are willing to 
invest sufficient time in the company, who 
possess teamwork abilities, communication skills, 
integrity as well as understanding of their own 
duties and the law. 
Corporate governance is also partially covered by 
the “duties and responsibilities of company direct-
ors” module (Companies Commission of Malay-
sia, 2001a) under the heading “the role and duties 
of independent directors”, in which it was 
suggested that at least one-third of the board be 
composed of independent directors. 
4.0 SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR 
IMPROVING THE COVERAGE OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
CORPORATE DIRECTORS TRAIN-
ING PROGRAMME 
 
Several observations could be made of CDTP, 
especially with regards to the subject of corporate 
governance.  First of all, as the majority of 
companies in Malaysia are small to medium in 
size, most of the directors who attended or are 
supposed to attend CDTP are not directors of 
publicly listed companies.  It is not surprising 
then that most of the directors are not concerned 
with the detailed and (to them) complicated 
corporate-governance requirements of listed 
companies.  They are, again not unexpectedly, 
more concerned with the “hands-on” aspects of 
corporate governance which can enhance the 
performance and prospects of their companies, 
for, recalling De Geus (1995) above, a company 
needs a higher level of skill in dealing with 
changing environment (as is prevalent in Malay-
sia’s business environment).   
 
Moreover, the unilateral descriptions of laws and 
rules regarding corporate governance will not 
make an impression on the participating directors.  
Instead, what these directors are constantly 
curious and eager to learn about are the specta-
cular successes as well as deplorable failures and 
scandals that had plagued both local and foreign 
companies, big and small, and the (lack of) 
corporate-governance issues that underlie these 
corporate affairs.  Finally, some of the directors 
are also keen on voicing the problems they faced 
in their companies and asking for tentative 
solutions from a corporate-governance perspect-
ive.  This is not surprising as Senge’s (1990) 
opined that the leaders’ (in this case the 
directors’) role in a learning organisation (in this 
case a company) is that of a designer, teacher and 
steward who can build shared vision and 
challenge prevailing mentalities 
 
With these observations in mind, it is hereby 
proposed that the corporate governance module of 
CDTP may be overhauled and improved.  The 
history portion as well as the myriad listings of 
rules and regulations may be eliminated.  Instead, 
the module could be roughly divided into three 
units.  The first unit should straightforwardly 
provide best practices and recommended princi-
ples to be adopted by companies (to be discussed 
below).  The second unit may apply these 
practices and principles in explaining the real-life, 
prominent corporate successes or failures, which 
can help to retain the participants’ attention.  The 
last unit will then allow the participating directors 
to engage in a question-and-answer session on 
corporate-governance matters which they are 
particularly concerned with, or for the lecturer to 
moderate discussions on hypothetical examples.  
The time length of each of these units are not 
specified, and should be adjusted according to the 
lecturer’s “feel” of their respective suitability to 
the particular group of participating directors. 
 
4.1 Best Practices and Recommended 
Principles 
 
Various best practices and recommended 
principles, not the least from the Malaysian Code 
of Corporate Governance (Malaysian Institute of 
Corporate Governance, 2000), could be the 
subjects of the first unit in the corporate-
governance module.  For example, the indispens-
able role of the board of directors to the proper 
functioning of a company should be highlighted.  
The board is responsible for setting the corporate 
objectives and reviewing and monitoring their 
implementations.  It should also supervise 
management and review and implement sound 
financial control systems and risk management 
measures of the company.  These recommend-
ations are in line with Senge’s (1990) opinion 
above that leaders’ role in a learning organisation 
as designer, teacher and steward who can build 
shared vision and challenge prevailing menta-
lities.   
 
4.2 Transparent Procedure for Board 
Composition 
 
For effective execution of the responsibilities of 
the boards of directors, board appointments 
should also be transparent and be carried out with 
formality with proper procedures, such as, if 
possible, recommendation by a nomination 
committee.  It is also suggested that all directors 
be submitted for re-election at least every three 
years.  Indeed, a balanced board is also crucial in 
this respect.  The representation of majority share-
holders in the board should also be proportionate 
to their shareholding.  The size of the board 
should be reviewed such that it comprises an 
optimum mix of executive and independent 
directors.  Independent directors are company 
directors who are not substantially related to the 
company in which they are about to serve.  They 
are typically appointed for their expertise and 
achievements in the particular business sector in 
which the company is interested.  The appoint-
ment of independent directors is particularly 
important to a company since, as Stonehouse and 
Pemberton (1999) pointed out, organisational 
knowledge, which aids decision-making, behav-
iour and actions, is primarily developed from 
individuals in the organisation, and a company’s 
actions could be improved through better know-
ledge and understanding (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). 
 
4.3 Directors’ Remuneration 
 
A related issue is that of directors’ remuneration.  
The level and composition of remuneration 
packages for executive directors should be suf-
ficient while the packages for non-executive 
directors should be based on their relevant duties 
and responsibilities.  The determination of the 
remunerations should be formal and transparent, 
with, if possible, recommendations by a remune-
ration committee.  The directors’ remuneration 
packages should also be disclosed in the 
company’s annual report.  It should also be kept 
in mind that the pay gap between the management 
and the staff of the company should not be too 
wide as that would affect the morale of the 
employees which in turn may hurt the company’s 
productivity. 
 
4.4 Roles of Chairman and CEO 
 
In addition, another set of best practices and 
recommended principles on corporate governance 
has to do with the roles of chairman and chief 
executive officers in a company.  The powers, 
roles and responsibilities of both positions should 
be clearly spelled out in the company’s by-laws.  
Ideally, the chairman and the CEO should be held 
by two different persons, with the former leading 
the board in supervising the latter, who in turn 
implements the policies and decisions of the 
board within and outside of the company.  
Furthermore, the separation of the two positions 
also enable healthy and constructive interaction 
between them, and as Cangelosi and Dill (1965) 
suggested, interactions between adaptation at the 
individual level and adaptation at the organisa-
tional level constituted organizational learning 
(which is crucial in a knowledge economy).  
However, if these two positions are merged, as is 
typical in many small-to-medium size companies, 
the reasons should at least be explained to the 
shareholders.   
 
4.5 Code of Conduct 
 
In addition, a code of conduct setting out high 
standard of integrity and ethics should be drafted, 
adopted and implemented for both the directors as 
well as the employees of the company.  As Pem-
berton and Stonehouse (1999) indicated, explicit 
knowledge (Demarest, 1997), being tangible, 
clearly stated and consisting of details which can 
be recorded and stored.  As part of the code of 
conduct, it should be required that any conflict of 
interest between a director and the company 
should be declared and recorded in company 
meetings. 
 
4.6 Investor Relations 
 
Yet another subject which could be covered by 
the first unit in the corporate-governance module 
is investor relations.  As Stonehouse and 
Pemberton (1999) pointed out, knowledge is a 
shared collection of principles, facts, skills and 
rules.  When a company is still in a closely-held 
stage, most of the shareholders are probably also 
the relatives or closed associates of the directors, 
and they may meet and discuss company matters 
on a daily basis.  Hence the knowledge of the 
company could be readily communicated.  As the 
company grows, however, more outsiders would 
become shareholders of the company.  Typically, 
the directors meet shareholders only once per 
year, at the annual general meeting, or not at all, 
as is prevalent in some companies which “skip” 
their annual general meetings.  Human psycho-
logy dictates that the lack of communications 
between the shareholders and the directors will 
cause much misunderstanding and unwarranted 
doubts and suspicions that could hurt the interest 
of the company.  As such, the company should 
have a coherent set of corporate communication 
policy, perhaps setting up an investor relations / 
corporate communications department as a 
“bridge” for disseminating relevant company 
information to shareholders, explaining director’s 
decisions and obtaining feedbacks from the 
shareholders as to their concerns.  The investor 
relations department may also assist potential 
investors in making their decisions as to whether 
or not they should invest in the company.  This is 
particularly important in modern companies 
composed of shareholders for, as suggested 
above, the ability of company to compete will 
depend increasingly upon their ability to, inter 
alia, create maximum market value for the comp-
any’s knowledge (Finerty, 1997; Stonehouse and 
Pemberton, 2000), and one way of doing this is by 
appropriately and effectively disseminating 
relevant company knowledge by means of 
investor relations activities. 
 
4.7 Corporate Financial Reporting 
 
Moreover, the first unit in the corporate-
governance module can also touch upon the 
recently much debated issue of financial report-
ing.  As Rampersad (2002), pointed out, 
knowledge is a function of culture (in this case, 
company culture).  Some companies are more 
willing to disclose their financial details than 
others.  In any case, a good rule of thumb is that 
companies should prepare clear and under-
standable balance sheets and other financial 
statements that comply with the standards of 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board.  
Appropriate explanations should also be provided 
in the financial statements for any significant 
setbacks or successes of the company.  Relatedly, 
a proper and effective internal control / internal 
audit system should be set up in the company.  If 
possible, an internal audit department should be 
set up, perhaps supervised by an audit committee 
which has terms of reference and which is made 
up of a majority of independent directors and also 
chaired by an independent director. 
 
4.8 Structural Suggestions 
 
If appropriate, the second (application of best 
practices and recommended principles to real-life 
examples) and third (questions-and–answers / 
discussions) units of the corporate-governance 
module can be merged, with either the lecturer or 
the participants providing topics or hypothetical 
examples for the exercise.  After all, as pointed 
out above, organisational learning, crucial for 
survival of a company in a knowledge economy, 
is about detecting errors or anomalies and correct-
ing them by restructuring organisational theories 
in use (Argyris and Schoen, 1978).  The idea here 
is to enable the participating directors to realise 
that corporate governance is for all types of 
companies, and not just large companies. 
 
5.0 GENERAL SUGGESTIONS FOR 
IMPROVING THE CORPORATE 
DIRECTORS TRAINING PRO-
GRAMME 
 
The several observations made at the beginning of 
the last section is recalled and extrapolated here.  
In general, directors participating in CDTP are 
more concerned with the hands-on aspects of the 
various subjects, and they would be interested in 
how companies succeed or fail by doing or not 
doing what the CDTP subjects say they should or 
should not do.  And they would understandably be 
raising questions which are specific about their 
own companies. 
 
Presently, CDTP is formatted in such a way that 
two modules are delivered on the first morning, 
two in the afternoon and the last two the next 
morning.  Each module is delivered by a lecturer 
who typically speaks for around one and a quarter 
hour followed by about five to fifteen minutes of 
question-and-answer session, if any.  It is quite 
evident that such a course structure is not quite 
conducive to satisfying what the participating 
directors are looking for in CDTP.  The basically 
lecture format of CDTP will simply bore the 
participating directors and thereby decrease their 
absorption of the materials.  It is thus proposed to 
increase the “interactive components” of the 
modules.  This can be accomplished in three 
ways.  First, the lecturer should limit himself to 
no more than one hour of lecture, followed by 
half an hour of question-and-answer to provide 
the participating directors with ample time to vent 
their doubts.  Second, as suggested in the previous 
section on corporate governance, the hour-long 
lecture should be further divided into two half-
hour “units”, with the first unit be concerned with 
the introduction and explanation of recommended 
principles and best practices, while the second 
unit should be about the applications of such 
principles and practices in real-life companies as 
well as the consequences.  Third, even during his 
lecture, the lecturer should from time to time 
invite interaction by for example asking the 
participating directors to repeat what he said or 
finish off his sentence or provide an example 
which lives out the theory, etc.  This will create a 
lively atmosphere which chases away the 
participating directors’ boredom and forces them 
to concentrate on the course content by demand-
ing their active participation. 
 
It is further proposed that the six modules be 
completed in the first day, three in the morning, 
three in the afternoon.  There is no danger of loss 
of concentration on the part of the participating 
directors if three (as opposed to two) modules are 
delivered over a morning or an afternoon, 
provided the format in the preceding paragraph is 
followed.  It is assumed, of course, that there are 
breaks in between the modules.  On the other 
hand, the next morning is devoted exclusively to 
exercises and evaluation.  The exercises can take 
different forms.  If there are a lot of participating 
directors in a CDTP session (the current allowable 
maximum is 120), they could be divided into 
groups of, say, five or six.  They could, for ex-
ample, engage in group discussion as to how the 
course materials they learn the previous day could 
help them improve the performance of their own 
companies, or their particular industry or indeed 
companies in general.  Each group should 
summarise their finding and report it back to the 
“plenary” moderated by the lecturer who 
encourages further discussion as a whole.  Alt-
ernatively, or in addition, the groups could also 
each take a case study prepared by distilling real-
life corporate examples.  They may, for example, 
be presented with a corporate scenario, with each 
group member urged to play a role, and propose 
solutions for the extenuating situation.  They may 
then share their situation and solution with the 
“plenary” session, again facilitated by the lecturer 
who critiques their suggestions constructively.  
Lecturer would then sum up the whole course by 
asking for the participating directors to evaluate 
the course and suggest points for improvements, 
so that future CDTP may be further fine-tuned to 
suit the needs of the participating directors.   
 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS 
 
CDTP was organised to raise the awareness of 
company director towards, inter alia, corporate 
governance.  To accomplish this aim, the overall 
structure of CDTP, as well as its corporate 
governance components in particular, should be 
overhauled, with insightful inputs from know-
ledge management theories and practices.  It 
could readily be observed that the present layout 
of the corporate-governance portions of the 
course stresses heavily on theories and requi-
rements for publicly listed companies, and rather 
lightly on real-life applications in good corporate 
governance.  It is proposed that the corporate-
governance module be redesigned into three 
smaller units, the first concerning best practices 
and recommended principles in corporate 
governance, the second on the application (or lack 
thereof) of these practices and principles to real-
life examples from inside Malaysia and abroad, 
and the third unit being a question-and-answer / 
discussion segment for active participation by the 
directors attending the course.  The same pro-
posed format could be extended to the other five 
modules in CDTP.  Furthermore, the six modules 
in CDTP could be delivered in one day, with 
another half a day be used for exercises and 
evaluation, which are at least as important as the 
lectures delivered.  It is sincerely envisioned that 
the revamped CDTP as well as its corporate 
governance module will be more effective and 
efficient in achieving its goal of fostering a more 
healthy business environment in Malaysia. 
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